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TESTA, CRAIN, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
COLLATERAL RELIEF 
Carlos M. Vázquez* and Stephen I. Vladeck** 
 In Montgomery v. Louisiana,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that state 
prisoners have a constitutional right to relief from continued 
imprisonment if the prisoner’s conviction or sentence contravenes a new 
substantive rule of constitutional law.2 Specifically, the Court held that 
prisoners with such claims are constitutionally entitled to collateral relief 
in state court—at least if the state courts are open to other claims for 
collateral relief on the ground that their continued imprisonment is 
unlawful.3 In our article, The Constitutional Right to Collateral Post-
Conviction Relief, we argued that, under two lines of Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting the Supremacy Clause, states are in fact required 
to open their courts to claims based on new substantive rules of 
constitutional law even if the states’ courts do not have jurisdiction to 
entertain collateral claims as a matter of state law.4 
 In their recent article, State Jurisdictional Independence and Federal 
Supremacy, Professors Ann Woolhandler and Michael G. Collins dispute 
our reliance on these two lines of Supremacy Clause cases.5 Specifically, 
they argue that the Constitution, as originally understood and as 
interpreted throughout the nineteenth century, gives states discretion to 
control the jurisdiction of their own courts.6 This response briefly 
discusses Professors Woolhandler and Collins’s treatment of these two 
lines of Supremacy Clause cases, and explains why our previous reading 
of Montgomery holds.  
I.  THE TESTA LINE OF CASES 
 The first of the two lines of cases we relied upon is most closely 
associated with the Supreme Court’s decision in Testa v. Katt.7 In Testa, 
the Court held that the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to entertain 
federal claims if they have jurisdiction to entertain analogous state-law 
claims.8 In other words, state jurisdictional rules cannot discriminate 
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 1. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
 2. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729, 731. 
 3. See id. at 732. 
 4. Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, The Constitutional Right to Collateral Post-
Conviction Review, 103 VA. L. REV. 905, 929 (2017). 
 5. See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Jurisdictional Independence 
and Federal Supremacy, 72 FLA. L. REV. 73, 76–77, 105 n.185, 114, 116 (2020). 
 6. E.g., id. at 85–86, 92. 
 7. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
 8. Testa, 330 U.S. at 394.  
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against federal claims. Under this standard, whether state courts are 
required to entertain an action seeking collateral relief on the basis of the 
federal claim recognized in Montgomery depends on what counts as an 
analogous state-law claim. At a minimum, a state would have to provide 
a forum for a Montgomery claim if the state gives its courts jurisdiction 
to entertain actions for collateral relief on the basis of retroactively 
applicable new rules of state constitutional law. But the concept of an 
analogous state-law claim could be drawn at a broader level, requiring 
state courts to entertain a Montgomery claim if they have jurisdiction to 
entertain claims for collateral relief on the basis of any state constitutional 
claim, or even on any non-constitutional state-law ground. There is 
language in Montgomery suggesting that the Court understood the 
concept of an analogous state-law claim broadly.9 For instance, the Court 
stated that state courts were obligated to entertain the type of claim 
involved in Montgomery at least as long as “state collateral review 
proceedings permit prisoners to challenge the lawfulness of their 
confinement.”10 
 We argued that the Court in Haywood v. Drown11 adopted an even 
broader view of the states’ obligation to provide a forum for federal 
claims.12 The issue in Haywood was whether New York could convert all 
damages claims against corrections officers into claims against the state 
itself in its Court of Claims—the effect, but not intent, of which would 
be to foreclose claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which the Supreme Court 
has interpreted not to authorize suits against states.13 The Court did not 
explicitly reject the idea that the states’ obligation to provide a forum for 
such claims depends on whether those states give their courts jurisdiction 
over analogous state-law claims, but it interpreted the concept of an 
“analogous” state-law claim very broadly.14 The majority concluded that 
the Supremacy Clause required New York to make its courts available 
for federal damages claims against corrections officers because New 
York courts were open to damages claims against other state officials and 
equitable claims against corrections officials.15 More generally, the Court 
relied on the fact that the states’ courts are courts of general jurisdiction 
generally open to claims in law and equity.16 We argued that the Court’s 
reasoning supported the conclusion that a state court is required to grant 
 
 9. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 731–32 (2016).  
 10. Id. at 731. But cf. id. at 731 (“If a state collateral proceeding is open to a claim controlled 
by federal law, the state court ‘has a duty to grant the relief that federal law requires.’” (quoting 
Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 218 (1988))). 
 11. 556 U.S. 729 (2009). 
 12. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 933–34.  
 13. See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 731, 734 n.4 (citation omitted). 
 14. Id. at 740 n.6 (citation omitted). 
 15. Id. at 736–37. 
 16. See id. at 739. 
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state prisoners a forum in which to seek collateral relief on the grounds 
recognized in Montgomery as long as their courts have jurisdiction to 
grant equitable relief from ongoing violations of law.17 If the fact that a 
states’ courts have jurisdiction over claims “at law” means that those 
courts must entertain federal claims for damages against state correction 
officials, then it follows that a states’ courts are required to grant relief 
from ongoing unconstitutional incarceration if they have jurisdiction to 
grant prospective relief from ongoing unlawful conduct.18 Habeas relief, 
after all, is just one type of prospective relief from an ongoing unlawful 
detention.19 
 Professors Woolhandler and Collins do not quarrel with our 
interpretation of Testa or Haywood.20 Rather, they dispute the correctness 
of these decisions, arguing that a requirement that state courts entertain 
federal claims—even if they have jurisdiction over analogous state-law 
claims—is not supported by the original understanding of the 
Constitution and conflicts with nineteenth-century Supreme Court 
decisions.21 We did not attempt to defend the principle established in the 
Testa line of cases as required by the original understanding or earlier 
judicial decisions, and we will not attempt a comprehensive defense here. 
Instead, we will limit ourselves to a few observations.  
 First, with respect to the original understanding of the Constitution, 
while there may not have been affirmative statements by the Framers that 
state courts were obligated to entertain federal claims, the position 
eventually adopted in Testa and Haywood is more consistent with a key 
feature of the original design—the Madisonian Compromise—than is the 
position advocated by Professors Woolhandler and Collins. The Framers 
were divided about whether the Constitution should create lower federal 
courts or should instead provide only for a federal Supreme Court. 
Notably, the latter was the regime supported by the Framers most 
protective of state prerogatives.22 As Professors Woolhandler and Collins 
recognize, if this view had prevailed, the Constitution would, of 
necessity, have required state courts to entertain federal causes of action, 
as there would not have been lower federal courts in which to adjudicate 
 
 17. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 913–14. 
 18. Id. at 933.  
 19. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908), discussed in Vázquez & Vladeck, 
supra note 4, at 933. 
 20. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 5, at 75 (“In Haywood v. Drown, . . . the Court 
extended the Testa line by holding that even a nondiscriminatory state jurisdictional rule was not 
a valid excuse for denying jurisdiction over a federal statutory claim if the state’s rule evinced 
hostility to the substantive federal claim.”). 
 21. See id. at 78. 
 22. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 7–9 (7th ed., 2015). 
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federal rights.23 The Framers ultimately adopted the Madisonian 
Compromise, under which the Constitution created only a Supreme Court 
and left it to Congress to decide whether to create lower federal courts.24 
The default regime established by the Constitution, therefore, was one in 
which enforcement of federal law mainly depended on state courts. 
Professors Woolhandler and Collins claim that the requirement that state 
courts entertain federal claims did not survive the Framers’ decision to 
empower Congress to create lower federal courts.25 But, if they are right, 
the Madisonian Compromise would have been all but illusory. In theory, 
Congress would have had the power to decline to create lower federal 
courts, but it would have been able to exercise this power only in the 
unlikely event that it decided not to create any federal claims.  
Moreover, Professors Woolhandler and Collins would adopt, in the 
name of states’ rights, a position that conflicts with the apparent 
preferences of the Framers most concerned about states’ rights. 
Professors Woolhandler and Collins maintain that, if Congress wants to 
create judicially enforceable federal rights that do not depend upon the 
whims of state legislatures, Congress has to create lower federal courts 
and give them jurisdiction over such claims.26 But the Framers who most 
wished to protect state prerogatives believed it would have been more 
protective of states’ rights to vest jurisdiction over such claims in the state 
courts than to have the Constitution create lower federal courts.27 In other 
words, states’ rights advocates presumably would have preferred to have 
federal claims enforced in state courts, subject to Supreme Court review, 
than to have Congress create lower federal courts and vest jurisdiction 
over such claims in such courts. 
Professors Woolhandler and Collins do not address these arguments 
in their article but, in earlier work, Professor Collins has defended a 
“revisionist” understanding of the Madisonian Compromise, arguing that 
the understanding of the Compromise that has prevailed for much of 
American history is historically inaccurate.28 This is not the place to 
examine Professor Collins’s historical claims. For present purposes, it 
suffices to note that, as Professor Collins candidly admits, acceptance of 
his views would require a reexamination not just of the Testa line of 
cases, but also of many other “fundamental tenets of federal courts 
 
 23. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 5, at 80–81. 
 24. Id. at 79–80.  
 25. See id. at 81. 
 26. Id. at 84–85.  
 27. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
 28. See Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian 
Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 196 (1995) (describing his view of the Madisonian 
Compromise as “revisionist”). 
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law.”29 Moreover, his claims were expressly considered by the Court in 
Haywood, and only Justice Thomas was convinced to reconsider settled 
precedents on the basis of these arguments.30 Indeed, since the Haywood 
decision, the Court has unanimously endorsed the Haywood 
interpretation of the Supremacy Clause rather than the interpretation 
endorsed by Professors Woolhandler and Collins.31 
Not all of the cases that Professors Woolhandler and Collins now rely 
upon were brought to the Court’s attention in Haywood. Most notably, 
Professors Woolhandler and Collins rely on nineteenth-century Supreme 
Court decisions dismissing appeals from the state courts on the ground 
that the state court had held that it lacked jurisdiction over the case.32 
These decisions are not inconsistent with Testa or Haywood, however, as 
they did not involve federal rights of action. Federal statutes did lurk in 
the background of these cases, but the claimants raised common law 
rights of action. Semple v. Hagar33 was an action to quiet title in real 
property.34 In Smith v. Adsit,35 the plaintiff filed a bill in equity seeking 
 
 29. Id. at 39. Indeed, acceptance of Professors Woolhandler and Collins’ argument would 
require reconsideration of settled doctrine outside the Federal Courts field. See, e.g., Ann 
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Discrimination and Full Faith and Credit, 63 
EMORY L.J. 1023, 1028 (2014) (arguing on similar grounds that the holding of Hughes v. Fetter 
regarding state court obligation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to entertain causes of action 
based on sister state law was wrong). 
 30. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 748 n.2 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referencing 
Collins, supra note 28, at 144). Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined Justice Thomas’s 
dissent (as to Part III) insofar as it concluded that state courts were not required to exercise 
jurisdiction over federal claims if they lacked jurisdiction over analogous state-law claims. Id. at 
742. They did not join the portion of Justice Thomas’s dissent adopting the view of Professors 
Woolhandler and Collins that state courts are not required to entertain federal claims even if those 
courts have jurisdiction over analogous state-law claims. Id.  
 31. See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 382 n.12 (2012). Mims involved a 
federal statute establishing a private right of action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
(TCPA) and provided that the action may be brought in state court “if otherwise permitted by the 
laws or rules of court of [the] State.” Id. at 382 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2012)). In Mims, 
the Court wrote: 
The Supremacy Clause declares federal law the “supreme law of the land,” and 
state courts must enforce it “in the absence of a valid excuse.” Howlett v. Rose, 
496 U.S. 356, 370, n. 16 (1990). “An excuse that is inconsistent with or violates 
federal law is not a valid excuse: The Supremacy Clause forbids state courts to 
dissociate themselves from federal law because of disagreement with its content 
or a refusal to recognize the superior authority of its source.” Id., at 371. Without 
the “if otherwise permitted” language, there is little doubt that state courts would 
be obliged to hear TCPA claims. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947). 
Mims, 565 U.S. at 382 n.12.  
 32. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 5, at 88–90.  
 33. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 431 (1866).  
 34. Semple, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 432. 
 35. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 185 (1872).  
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an accounting and the establishment of a trust based on allegations of 
fraud.36 In support of an alternative argument, the plaintiff invoked a 
federal statute that declared certain warrants to be nullities,37 but the 
statute was not the source of his right of action. The Supreme Court 
concluded that it was unclear that the lower court had even relied on the 
statute in reaching its judgment.38 Further, it surmised that the higher state 
court may well have concluded that the lower court lacked jurisdiction 
because “the plaintiff’s remedy against Adsit was at law, and not in 
equity, even if the sale from Holmes to him was utterly void.”39 In neither 
case does the Court’s acceptance of the state court’s determination that it 
lacked jurisdiction establish that the state court would have been equally 
free to dismiss federally created rights of action.  
 Professors Woolhandler and Collins also argue that requiring state 
courts to entertain federal claims would amount to commandeering state 
courts in contravention of the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering 
doctrine.40 But whether the Constitution prohibits commandeering of 
state officials is itself controversial. More importantly, even the Justices 
who concluded that the Constitution prohibits commandeering of state 
legislative and executive officials acknowledged that the Constitution 
permits commandeering of state judicial officials.41 Indeed, the Court in 
Printz v. United States42 exempted state judicial officials from the anti-
commandeering prohibition because the Supremacy Clause expressly 
contemplates such commandeering.43 The debate among the Justices in 
the anti-commandeering cases concerned whether the Constitution 
prohibits commandeering of state legislative and executive officials, and 
the Supremacy Clause, as interpreted in Testa, was put forward as a basis 
for rejecting the anti-commandeering doctrine altogether.44 The majority 
ultimately distinguished Testa on the ground that the Supremacy Clause 
draws a distinction between state judges and other state officials.45 That 
the Constitution does not prohibit commandeering of state judges 
 
 36. See Smith, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 186–87; see also Smith v. Adsit, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 
368, 369 (1874). 
 37. See Smith, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 186. 
 38. Id. at 190.  
 39. Id.  
 40. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 5, at 101.  
 41. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997) (recognizing “that the Constitution 
was originally understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal 
prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions related to matters appropriate for the judicial power”). 
 42. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).  
 43. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby . . . .”) (emphasis added); see Printz, 521 U.S. at 907. 
 44. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 928–29. 
 45. See id. 
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performing judicial functions was common ground in the anti-
commandeering cases. 
Finally, it is worth observing that there is more than a little irony in 
the argument by Professors Woolhandler and Collins that state courts are 
not obligated to entertain Montgomery claims because the 
Testa/Haywood line of cases is inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court 
decisions. Montgomery holds that prisoners have a right to relief from 
continued imprisonment if their convictions or sentences contravene a 
retroactively applicable new rule of constitutional law.46 The very 
existence of “new” rules of constitutional law is a clear acknowledgment 
that the Court recognizes—and presumably adheres to—constitutional 
decisions even if the rules established in those decisions lack clear 
support in earlier constitutional decisions.47 
II.  THE CRAIN LINE OF CASES 
 In arguing that state courts are required to provide a forum in which a 
state prisoner can seek collateral relief from retroactively applicable new 
rules of constitutional law, we noted that a separate line of Supremacy 
Clause decisions provided even more direct support: the line of cases 
most closely associated with General Oil Co. v. Crain.48 Crain held that 
a state law denying its courts jurisdiction to grant a remedy that is 
required by the Constitution is not an “adequate” state ground preventing 
direct review in the Supreme Court.49 It follows that state courts are 
required to provide constitutionally required remedies even if those 
courts lack jurisdiction to do so under state law. Crain supports our 
conclusion that state courts must provide the remedy recognized in 
Montgomery even more directly than does the Testa line of cases because 
Montgomery involved a constitutionally required remedy while the Testa 
line of cases involved federal statutory rights of action.50 
 Professors Woolhandler and Collins argue that the original 
understanding of the Constitution and nineteenth-century caselaw are as 
inconsistent with the Crain line of cases as with the Testa line of cases.51 
But their position regarding constitutionally required remedies is even 
less plausible from the perspective of constitutional structure than their 
position with respect to federal statutory claims. When Congress creates 
 
 46. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 729–31 (2016).  
 47. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (“In general, . . . a case announces a new 
rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal 
Government.”). 
 48. 209 U.S. 211 (1908), nonacq. Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95 (1929); see 
Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 937. 
 49. Crain, 209 U.S. at 226–27. 
 50. See supra notes 43–44, 49 and accompanying text.  
 51. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 5, at 93 & n.129. 
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a right of action, it can be expected to give the lower federal courts 
jurisdiction over such claims if state courts are not constitutionally 
obligated to entertain those claims. But the availability of a 
constitutionally required remedy should not depend on a congressional 
decision to confer jurisdiction on the lower federal courts. By hypothesis, 
such remedies should be available even if Congress does not favor them. 
For this reason, the Crain line of cases stands on even firmer ground as a 
matter of constitutional structure than the Testa line of cases.52 
Perhaps in silent recognition of the force of this structural argument, 
the treatment of Crain by Professors Woolhandler and Collins differs 
from their treatment of Testa and Haywood. Instead of arguing that Crain 
should be rejected entirely, they argue that Crain should be understood 
to require state courts to enforce constitutional remedies only when 
federal court jurisdiction to grant such remedies is either lacking or 
“disfavored.”53 They claim that this more limited requirement is 
consistent with the caselaw. 
 It is difficult to draw such a limited standard from Crain itself, 
however, as the Court decided Ex parte Young on the same day, and the 
Young decision appears to hold that federal courts do have the power to 
grant the constitutionally required remedy involved in Crain.54 Professors 
Woolhandler and Collins contend that, on the facts of Crain, federal 
jurisdiction to grant the relief involved in that case “may have been less 
than clear . . . even after the decision in Young.”55 If that is how they 
reconcile their position with Crain, however, their position would have 
to be that state courts are obligated to grant constitutionally required 
remedies if federal jurisdiction is lacking or disfavored or unclear.56 
 
 52. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 936 (“The conclusion that the state courts 
must entertain federal claims, subject only to neutral rules of administration that do not reflect 
hostility to the right, stands on an even stronger footing when the federal claim seeks a 
constitutionally required remedy.”). 
 53. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 5, at 113. 
 54. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 176 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
 55. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 5, at 110–11. 
 56. See id. Professors Woolhandler and Collins also rely on Ga. R.R. & Banking Co. v. 
Musgrove, 335 U.S. 900 (1949) (per curiam), in which the Supreme Court summarily dismissed 
the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, stating that the state court’s decision had rested on an 
adequate state law ground. Musgrove, 335 U.S. at 900. When contrasted with the Court’s later 
determination that the railroad’s suit could be brought in the lower federal courts, see Ga. R.R. & 
Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 304, 306 (1952), Professors Woolhandler and Collins 
argue, the summary dismissal in Musgrove reflects the Court’s view that states are free to deny 
their courts’ jurisdiction over constitutionally required remedies if lower federal courts are 
available to grant such remedies. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 5, at 111. It is difficult to 
know the Supreme Court’s rationale in Musgrove as the Court did not explain its reasoning, but 
to read the decision as standing for the principle advocated by Professors Woolhandler and Collins 
is a stretch. The state court in Musgrove determined that the state was entitled to sovereign 
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 Under that standard, state courts would appear to be required to 
entertain claims for the form of collateral relief involved in Montgomery, 
as we argued.57 Montgomery held that prisoners are constitutionally 
entitled to collateral relief if those prisoners’ convictions or sentences 
contravene a retroactively applicable new rule of constitutional law.58 
Whether federal courts have jurisdiction to grant habeas relief in such 
cases is unsettled. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (AEDPA) provides that the federal courts lack the power to grant 
habeas relief if the petitioner’s claim was adjudicated on the merits in 
state court unless the state court’s “adjudication of the claim resulted in a 
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 
the United States.”59 The text of the statute appears to deny the federal 
courts the power to grant relief based on federal law that was not clearly 
established at the time of conviction if the claim was adjudicated on the 
merits at trial. One could argue that AEDPA should be read to permit 
such claims, notwithstanding the text, and we have argued that AEDPA 
should be so interpreted.60 The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged 
that possibility but, so far, the Court has left the question open.61 If 
AEDPA obligates state courts to afford constitutionally required 
remedies as long as federal power to grant those remedies is unclear, then 
 
immunity from the railroad’s suit and it relied on federal as well as state precedents. Musgrove v. 
Ga. R.R. & Banking Co., 49 S.E.2d 26, 38 (Ga. 1948), appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 900 (per 
curiam). The court acknowledged that Ex parte Young held that a suit against a state official 
seeking prospective relief from an ongoing violation of the Constitution is not a suit against the 
state. Id. at 36. But, relying on In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), the court held that the Ex parte 
Young principle did not apply when the plaintiff seeks to enforce a contract with the state. 
Musgrove, 49 S.E.2d at 36–37. After the Supreme Court dismissed its appeal, the railroad filed 
an action in federal court that did not seek specific performance of its contract with the state, and 
the Court held that the state was not entitled to sovereign immunity. See Redwine, 342 U.S. at 305 
(interpreting Ayers as extending only to cases in which the plaintiff “merely [seeks] to obtain 
specific performance of a contract with the State”). The divergent results in the two cases—
Musgrove and Redwine—thus appear to have been based on the different forms of relief sought. 
There is no hint in either Supreme Court opinion that the Court understood that a state could deny 
its courts’ jurisdiction over constitutionally required remedies when a federal forum is available. 
The state court’s reliance in Musgrove on federal precedents about when a suit against an officer 
is actually against the state tends to contradict such a reading. 
 57. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 913–14.  
 58. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 729, 731 (2016).  
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2018).  
 60. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 938, 944. 
 61.  See Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 39 n.* (2011). Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in 
Montgomery mentions that this issue is unresolved. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 
741 (2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Amici in Edwards v. Vannoy have urged the Court to resolve 
the question this Term, even though it is not one of the questions on which the Court has granted 
certiorari. See Brief for Jonathan F. Mitchell and Adam K. Mortara, as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Neither Party at 14, Edwards v. Vannoy, No. 19-5807 (argued Dec. 2, 2020). 
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it obligates state courts to grant the constitutionally required remedy 
recognized in Montgomery if the claim was adjudicated on the merits at 
trial, at least until the Supreme Court resolves the question it has thus far 
left open.  
 Even if the Court resolves that question in favor of the existence of 
federal jurisdiction, state courts might still be required to grant the 
remedy on the ground that federal jurisdiction over such claims is 
“disfavored.” Professors Woolhandler and Collins argue that federal 
jurisdiction over a class of cases is “disfavored” when a federal statute, 
or federal caselaw, “substantially direct[s]” that the particular category of 
cases be brought in the state courts, even if the federal courts are given 
jurisdiction over the claims.62 It is unclear what sort of preference for 
state court adjudication Professors Woolhandler and Collins believe 
would trigger a state court obligation to grant such a remedy, but it seems 
likely that AEDPA would suffice. The general habeas regime for state 
prisoners reflects a preference for adjudicating these claims in state 
courts,63 and AEDPA itself appears to buttress that preference in a variety 
of ways.64 
 Even if the Court interpreted AEDPA to permit federal habeas relief 
in cases based on retroactively applicable new rules of constitutional 
law—and even if federal jurisdiction over such claims were not deemed 
to be “disfavored” in the sense contemplated by Professors Woolhandler 
and Collins—state courts would still be constitutionally obligated to grant 
such relief in circumstances in which AEDPA’s procedural rules would 
impose limits on federal jurisdiction that would be unconstitutional if 
imposed by states on state courts. For instance, we argued that AEDPA’s 
restrictions on “second or successive” petitions could violate the Due 
Process Clause if applied by state courts to claims based on retroactively 
applicable new rules of constitutional law.65 We concluded, based on the 
traditional understanding of the Madisonian Compromise, that AEDPA’s 
imposition of these procedural rules on the federal courts would probably 
not be unconstitutional because federal jurisdiction is constitutionally 
optional and state courts are obligated to grant the constitutionally 
required relief.66 Because Professors Woolhandler and Collins accept that 
state courts are obligated to grant the required relief if federal courts lack 
jurisdiction to grant it, they would appear to agree with our conclusion 
 
 62. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 5, at 112–13. 
 63. For example, state prisoners are required to exhaust available state court remedies prior 
to filing a habeas petition. See FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 22, at 1349–50 (describing the 
Exhaustion Requirement). 
 64. See supra note 61 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)); see also FALLON, JR., ET AL., supra 
note 22, at 1320 (noting AEDPA’s deference to state courts). 
 65. See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 4, at 956–57. 
 66. See id. at 957. 
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that state courts are constitutionally obligated to provide collateral review 
for state prisoners based on retroactively applicable new rules of 
constitutional law when Congress has imposed limits on the federal 
courts’ power to grant such relief that would violate the Due Process 
Clause if imposed by the states on state courts. 
 Professors Woolhandler and Collins argue that, even if state courts are 
obligated to provide constitutionally required remedies when federal 
court jurisdiction over such claims is lacking, disfavored, or unclear, the 
state courts do not have to “entertain the very same cause of action that 
the federal courts would have entertained.”67 We entirely agree. The 
express form of the remedy is not conclusive. We insist only that state 
courts are required to provide a collateral remedy that meets the 
minimum constitutional requirements. States need not call their remedies 
“habeas actions,” and states can impose their own procedural rules, as 
long as they satisfy federal due process limits. Indeed, our claim is that 
the state courts’ obligation to provide remedies meeting due process 
standards saves federal jurisdictional limitations from 
unconstitutionality. For the same reason, their worry that our position 
“could entail importing not only what [we] would consider the attractive 
aspects of federal habeas into state courts but could entail importing 
federal limitations and other complexities as well” is misplaced.68 
Recognizing state courts’ obligations to supply constitutionally required 
remedies in no way discourages states from providing constitutionally 
optional remedies or from experimenting with different procedures.69  
 In any event, Professors Woolhandler and Collins’s acceptance that 
state courts are obligated to provide constitutionally required remedies if 
federal jurisdiction is lacking or disfavored or unclear shows that their 
position with respect to constitutional remedies is very different from 
their position regarding federal statutory causes of action, even though 
both are, in their view, equally unsupported by the original understanding 
of the Constitution and nineteenth-century caselaw. With respect to 
constitutionally required remedies, state courts’ obligations depend 
entirely on Congress’ preferences. Professors Woolhandler and Collins 
agree with us that Congress can deny state courts’ jurisdiction by making 
federal jurisdiction exclusive, and they admit that Congress can require 
state courts to grant constitutionally required remedies by denying 
jurisdiction to federal courts or even by “disfavoring” federal 
jurisdiction.70 The difference between our positions thus appears to be 
 
 67. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 5, at 113. 
 68. Id. at 122. 
 69. See, e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 275 (2008) (“Neither Linkletter nor 
Teague explicitly or implicitly constrained the authority of the States to provide remedies for a 
broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable on federal habeas.”). 
 70.  Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 5, at 85–86, 116.  
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about the circumstances in which a congressional grant of federal court 
jurisdiction should be interpreted as an implicit withdrawal of state court 
jurisdiction. Our disagreement is thus, in the end, merely about statutory 
interpretation. This is hardly a profound debate about the Constitution’s 
protection of state jurisdictional independence.  
We think our position—that state courts retain an obligation to 
provide constitutionally required remedies unless Congress has 
expressly, or by clear implication, conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the 
federal courts—is far more administrable. Perhaps more importantly, we 
think our view is more compatible with the understanding of the 
Madisonian Compromise that has prevailed for much of American 
history and has, during that time, been the basis of numerous canonical 
Supreme Court decisions vis-à-vis the relations between state and federal 
courts. The arguments put forward by Professors Woolhandler and 
Collins, on the other hand, would require a rethinking not just of Testa 
and Haywood and Crain, but also of large swaths of Federal Courts 
doctrine. 
